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able under the statute. Particularly noteworthy cases have also
arisen under Article 31 and Article 32 of the CPLR.
The cases discussed herein are those deemed to be of the
most importance in the procedural area. Many other cases would
be included, but limitations of space prevent the treatment of those
less important but nevertheless significant cases. Few cases treated
in the Survey are exhaustively discussed. It is hoped, however,
that the Survey accomplishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the
practitioner to significant developments in the procedural law of
New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to key the reader to
those specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance
to him. The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically
treated in the cases are listed under their respective articles.
ARTIcLE 2-

LImiTATIONS OF

TIME

CPLR 204(a): Leave to sue MVAIC - statute of limitations tolled
while leave to sue is secured.
The victim of a hit-and-run automobile accident must, upon
notice to MVAIC, apply to the supreme court for an order permitting an action against MVAIC.Y In Creswell v. Doe,2 plaintiff
petitioned the supreme court for leave to sue MVAIC. Leave was
not granted until a time equal to the period of limitations for both
wrongful death and personal injuries had elapsed. 3 The court,
however, permitted the application of CPLR 204(a), which provides that the statute of limitations will be tolled for the duration
of a court-imposed stay or a statutory prohibition. Thus, the
statute of limitations was tolled from the time of the accident until
leave to sue MVAIC was obtained.
The fact that leave to sue was granted 127 days after the
wrongful death statute of limitations had expired, even when considered in conjunction with CPLR 2219, which gives a court sixty
days to file a decision on a motion, indicates that the motion was
made after the wrongful death statute had expired. Since suit
against MVAIC is statutorily prohibited until leave to sue is
granted, the court's construction of CPLR 204(a) suggests that
the entire period of time, from the accident to the granting of leave
to sue, is excluded from the statute of limitations. This may
allow the incongruous result that a hit-and-run victim may wait
an inordinate length of time before requesting leave to sue.
This result seems to be intended by the court, since the dissent
advised a strict application of the wrongful death statute of limI N.Y.

INs. LAW § 618(a).
222 App. Div. 2d 942, 255 N.Y.S.2d 946 (2d Dep't 1964).
3
N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 130; CPLR 214(5).
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itations, and due to the 127 day lapse between its expiration and
the granting of leave to sue. Caution should be exercised if reliance is to be placed on this opinion in view of the inherent
incongruity present when requesting a court to grant leave to
sue long after the applicable statute of limitations has expired.
CPLR 205(a): Failure to choose Jury and proceed to trial held
equivalent to neglect to prosecute.
CPLR 205(a) provides a six-month extension for the commencement of an action after the termination of a prior similar
case if such termination was for a reason other than voluntary4
discontinuance, neglect to prosecute, or a decision on the merits.
In Schunman v. Hertz Corp.,' the extension provided by CPLR
205 (a) was held inapplicable where the plaintiff wilfully failed to
choose a jury and proceed to trial in the previous action. This,
the court stated, was tantamount to neglect to prosecute and, therefore, excluded from the benefits conferred by CPLR 205(a) .
Previously, the courts allowed the six-month extension, holding that
failure to select a jury and proceed to trial was not neglect to
prosecute.7 The court in Schuman made no reference to the
prior contrary authority. The instant case appears to be consistent,
however, with recent judicial opinions checking the abuse of
CPLR 205(a) where the action is not actively pursued by the
plaintiff.CPLR 213(9): Fraud statute of limitations runs from discovery
where fraud is extraneous to original tort.
In DeVito v. New York Cent. Sys.,9 the complaint set out a
cause of action for common-law fraud based on the defendant's
fraudulent disclaimer of ownership of property upon which plaintiff
was injured by defendant's alleged negligence. The defendant, in
pleading the defense of the statute of limitations, claimed that the
gravamen of the action was actually the original negligence of
4CPLR 205 (a). The exception dealing with a final judgment on the
merits seems to be superfluous since a subsequent action would be res
judicata.
5 23 App. Div. 2d 646, 257 N.Y.S.2d 400 (lst Dep't 1965).
6 See CPLR 3216.
7 Scbneck v. S. T. Grand Inc., 11 Misc. 2d 923, 174 N.Y.S.2d 749, aff'd
without opinion, 6 App. Div. 2d 1047, 179 N.Y.S.2d 652 (2d Dep't 1958);
2 WEmnsmxN, KoRN & MImLER, NEW YoRx CIVI
PRACTiCE f1205.06

(1964).

8 Wright v. Defelice & Son, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 962, 256 N.Y.S.2d
63 (2d Dep't 1964); 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 205, supp. commentary 21, 22
(1965); 7B McKniNNY's CPLR 216, supp. commentary 77 (1965).
9 22 App. Div. 2d 600, 257 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1st Dep't 1965).

